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Abstract
This paper uses Australian Bureau of Statistics fiscal incidence figures to track 
trends across the period 1984 to 2010 in one key aspect of the Australian welfare 
state — whether welfare policies have favoured the elderly at the expense of the 
young. Our three main findings are: that there has been a substantial shift over 
this period in favour of the elderly; that this trend has accelerated rapidly in recent 
years; and that as a result of this accelerated trend, elderly households today are on 
average well off by comparison with younger households. We see little influence of 
party politics or ideology on the processes we are describing.
The lifecycle dimension of the Australian 
welfare state
At the most general level, the welfare state is in part about ‘vertical equity’ 
— the redistribution from those who have more to those who have less. But 
individuals within any income or wealth bracket vary according to gender, age 
and family responsibilities, and social policy also takes an interest in these so-
called horizontal categories. In this paper we are interested in the horizontal 
dimension of age. Our focus is on lifecycle stages. How does the Australian 
welfare state treat the elderly as compared with young adults and adults in mid-
life? We present an analysis of this key aspect of the Australian welfare state, 
based on the evidence of Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) fiscal incidence 
surveys. There are six surveys, taken at five-yearly intervals, beginning in 1984 
and ending (most recently) in 2009–10. We aim to determine whether — and, if 
so, to what extent — spending and taxing have tended to favour the elderly and 
drifted away from supporting the young across this 26-year period.
Leading Australian welfare analysts today tend to see the welfare state in terms 
of its impact on both age and family. In their 2001–02 fiscal incidence study, 
Harding et al. (2006: 195) concluded that the ‘impact of the welfare state ... 
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varies greatly by household type, with older Australians and sole parents 
emerging as the largest gainers from redistribution’. They added that ‘while 
there is substantial redistribution toward lower income couples, on average 
couples with children are not net gainers from the taxes and benefits considered 
in our study’. Cox (2003: 111) reached the same conclusion in his cross-national 
analysis: ‘In general, the welfare state redistributes away from childless couples 
under retirement age and couples with children towards single people, sole 
parents and the elderly. The extent of redistribution away from couples with 
children is greater in large than in small welfare states.’ In Australia, he noted, 
this redistributive effect is relatively small but the pattern is the same. Putting 
aside the case of support for sole parents, on these views the Australian welfare 
state transfers resources from the relatively income-rich but asset-poor stages of 
youth and mid-life to the relatively income-poor but asset-rich stages of later 
life.
These analyses raise two questions. First, what is the relative magnitude of these 
lifecycle transfers, when compared with vertical redistribution? Using data 
from the early 1990s, Falkingham and Harding (1996, as summarised in OECD 
2008: 100) quantified this as follows: ‘in Australia, 38% of lifetime benefits 
received by individuals, on average, were financed through taxes they paid 
at another stage in their lifecycle, and the remaining 62% of lifetime benefits 
involved redistribution between rich and poor’. We won’t pursue that point 
here. Secondly, how stable is this pattern of lifecycle transfers across time? Some 
analysts contend that as welfare states mature, policy favouritism drifts from the 
young to the elderly. The growing bias of the welfare state towards the elderly 
is a theme canvassed internationally (see, for example, OECD 1988; Thomson 
1996; Thomson 1999; Pierson 2006: 212–21). In the Australian literature, the 
focus has been on the fiscal sustainability of current policies given concerns 
about an ageing population (PC 2005; Harmer 2009; Henry 2009). Our purpose 
here is to analyse what has happened to age-related transfers in Australia in the 
past few decades. Our hypothesis is that expressed by Thomson (1996; 1999): 
net social support has shifted away from the young and towards the elderly.
Estimating ‘final income’
Fiscal incidence analysis quantifies the effects of government social expenditure 
and taxation on household incomes. In this analysis, social expenditure includes 
cash expenditure on pensions, benefit and allowances, but it also counts in-kind 
expenditure on health care, education and housing — these are estimated on 
the basis of government spending. The taxation figures include both personal 
income tax and consumption taxes such as the Goods and Service Tax whenever 
these can be ascribed to households. By taking into account both in-kind social 
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expenditures and taxation, fiscal incidence analysis provides a richer picture 
of the welfare state than conventional analysis, which tends to stop at the level 
of direct social expenditures. Indirect social expenditures total 50 per cent 
more than direct social expenditures, and progressive income tax has a greater 
redistributive effect than direct social expenditure (Fenna and Tapper 2012). 
Fiscal incidence analysis includes all levels of government, and is therefore 
superior to simply tracking Commonwealth budget trends as a means of gauging 
policy trends.
The key results of this kind of analysis are the ‘final income’ and the ‘net benefits’ 
for each household type. ‘Final income’ is the net of private income, taxes on 
income, the Medicare levy, family tax benefits, taxes on production, and social 
expenditures in cash and in-kind.2 ‘Net benefit’ is the sum of social expenditure 
minus household taxes. The fiscal incidence approach makes it possible to 
compare private incomes with final incomes, with the difference between the 
two being the redistributive impact governments have on household budgets. 
The ABS fiscal incidence figures include data on households classified by age of 
household head. It is now possible to track household types classified by age 
group across 26 years. This permits us to examine age-related changes in welfare 
redistribution across time, thus moving beyond static pictures of the welfare 
state at particular points in time.
All else being equal, policy intentions and actions should correlate with fiscal 
incidence evidence at the household level. But all else is rarely equal. Spending 
increases intended for particular categories may be swallowed up by increased 
taxes or unnoticed losses in other parts of the budget. Lynch (2006: 4) has 
attempted to measure the ‘age orientation’ of welfare states using what she terms 
the Elderly/Non-elderly Spending Ratio, defined as ‘the ratio of direct social 
expenditures on the elderly (pensions and services for the elderly) to spending 
on the non-elderly (unemployment benefits, active labour market policy, family 
allowances and family services), adjusted for the relative size of the elderly and 
non-elderly populations’. This is very useful as far as it goes; however, this 
measure suffers from its failure to include taxation. The strength of the fiscal 
incidence surveys is that they track both social expenditure and taxation on 
households. The sum of the two is the ‘net benefits’ of taxing and spending. We 
think this gives a more robust guide to policy trends and effects.
It is important to note that the fiscal incidence figures do not track actual 
households but household types.3 As their circumstances change, individual 
2 All dollar figures in this paper have been adjusted for inflation, using 2010 as the base year. In the tables 
below, the figures shown are the mean for the sample of the household type. Taxation figures are not actual 
reported figures but are imputed from standard tax rates. For some cautions about using ABS figures to make 
comparisons across time, see ABS Cat. No. 6537.0, 2001, 53–55.
3 Tracking actual households would require a panel study such as the Household, Income and Labour 
Dynamics Australia (HILDA) survey. At present HILDA has just 10 years of data.
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households move in and out of these categories. The fiscal incidence trends 
indicate changes in policy outcomes, not changes in actual households. However, 
because the period covered by the fiscal incidence surveys includes 15 years of 
Labor government in Canberra (1984–96 and 2007–10) and 11 years of Coalition 
government (1996–2007), we can attempt to match up policy intentions with 
policy outcomes. How far did Labor or the Coalition achieve what they set 
out as their policy aims? In this paper, we will be both analysing changes in 
the fortunes of different age groups and family types while also exploring the 
question of how policies have translated at the household level.
Policy 1983 to 2010
Labor, 1983–1996
The cornerstone of the Australian welfare state is the age pension, until 
recently available to men at age 65 and women at age 60. The scheme has always 
been non-contributory and means tested, with both income and assets tests. 
The Fraser government had removed the assets test in 1976, but the Labor 
government restored it in 1985, signifying a desire to keep elderly entitlements 
under control. Since 1972, when the Whitlam government raised the single age 
pension from 20 to 25 per cent of male average weekly earnings, it has stayed 
close to the 25 per cent mark (Harmer 2009: Chart 4: 33). Labor’s commitment 
to tight control of pension costs was expressed by former Finance Minister 
Peter Walsh. Responding to those who say ‘we have paid taxes all our lives and 
therefore we are entitled to a pension’, he remarks:
Except for a brief period between 1976 and 1984, there has always been 
an assets test, which prior to 1976 was much more rigorous than it is now. 
Today’s aged may or may not have paid taxes and, if they did, they paid 
taxes commensurate to funding a much more targeted pension, paid at a 
much lower rate to a smaller proportion of a smaller aged population. … 
By any measure, today’s aged are treated generously — more generously 
than they treated the aged when they were of prime working age (Walsh 
1995: 112–3).
Labor did introduce one radical change: compulsory superannuation, intended 
ultimately to replace the age pension for most wage and salary earners. 
Employers were required to withhold a set percentage of employee wages or 
salaries for accumulation in a superannuation fund. The aim was a dual one: to 
improve the adequacy of retirement incomes, and to reduce the long-run cost 
of retirement incomes to the public purse, especially in light of demographic 
trends. This applied, however, to a future generation of elderly, not to those 
currently nearing retirement.
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The Coalition, 1996–2007
In the retirement incomes system, the Coalition confirmed in law the principle 
that the single age-pension rate was to be 25 per cent of male total average 
weekly earnings. It was as willing to provide substantial — though means tested 
— support to the elderly as to support families with children. It also accepted 
the principle of compulsory superannuation, though it declined to introduce 
further increases beyond the nine per cent contribution level.
Labor 2007–10
The Rudd government was elected on a commitment to supporting ‘working 
families’. Nevertheless, a major review of the financial status of seniors was 
instigated, published as The Retirement Income System: report on strategic issues 
(Henry 2009). This led to a substantial increase in the single age pension in 2009.
Taxes, benefits and age groups
In the next two sections we summarise trends at the household level, using age 
group data for the period 1984 to 2009–10. Is the welfare state skewed towards 
the elderly? And has there been a shift in welfare priorities from young to old? 
The fiscal incidence figures allow us to discover any skewing and to track this 
kind of trend. The ABS breaks up its incomes data into age brackets. In Table 1 
we compare the net benefits to each age group from 1984 to 2009–10.
Table 1: Net benefits by age group, 1984 to 2009–10 (in 2010 dollars per 
household per week)
Ages 1984 1988–89 1993–94 1998–99 2003–04 2009–10 Change 1984 to 2009–10
15–24 -68 -127 3 47 -5 14 +82
25–34 -113 -200 -50 -50 -149 -145 -32
35–44 -21 -105 -13 18 -21 44 +65
45–54 -129 -179 -131 -168 -171 -96 +33
55–64 18 -19 78 58 -17 -7 -25
65+ 341 372 422 416 436 602 +261
All 14 -37 53 51 18 91 +77
Source: ABS Cat. No. 6537.0. ‘Net benefits’ is defined in the ABS’s ‘Explanatory notes’ as ‘total benefits 
minus total taxes’.
If we compare each age group with the trend for all households, two things 
stand out. First, there are large losses to two age groups: those aged 25–34 (down 
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$109pw compared with the general trend) and those aged 55–64 (down $102pw); 
and there are large gains to those aged 65 and over (up $184pw). Support has 
swung sharply towards the end of life.
In Figure 1, we compare final incomes in these age groups across 26 years. The 
general trend (not shown in Figure 1) is flat for the first decade, rises slightly in 
the second, and rises sharply in the last six years; overall there is a 59 per cent 
gain. The relevant question is whether the five age groups rise or fall relative to 
that general trend. The youngest groups, 15–24, 25–34 and 35–44, gain by 44 
per cent, 45 per cent and 47 per cent respectively. The middle age group, 45–54, 
gains by 50 per cent. The 55–64 age group remains rather flat in the first two 
decades, then leaps dramatically in the last period, gaining 75 per cent overall. 
Similarly, the elderly group, 65 and over, gains in the last five years, rising 98 
per cent overall. Thus, the older groups gain relative to the general trend, while 
younger households fall relatively. The swing favouring the elderly is largely a 
feature of the 2000s.
Figure 1: Trends in final incomes by age group, 1984 to 2009–10
Source: ABS Cat. No. 6537.0.
How should we interpret the trends in the age group data? In Table 2 we look at 
the break-up across time of taxes and expenditures for three household types. We 
include couples with dependent children, since they are one useful benchmark 
against which to compare the fortunes of elderly households. For a broader and 
more basic benchmark, we also compare the elderly with ‘all households’.
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Table 2 shows how changes in taxation have played an important part in changes 
in net social support. Income tax has both grown and shifted target. In 2009–10, 
those 65 and over paid $40pw in income tax, less than was paid in 1984; while 
a couple with dependent children paid $447pw, 50 per cent more than in 1984. 
For all households, income taxes grew by only eight per cent in that period. 
Indirect taxes have also grown and shifted target in a similar manner. They have 
grown for the elderly, but not as much as for all households, and markedly less 
than for couple families. Overall, taxes on the elderly grew by 42 per cent, on 
couple families by 70 per cent, and on all households by 30 per cent. Taxation 
changes have disadvantaged couple families. The elderly have also increased 
their share of taxation, but by a considerably lesser fraction.
On the benefits side, we can see that both the elderly and couple families gained 
very considerably when compared with all households. The biggest single factor 
here was health care expenditures, which have both grown overall and swung in 
favour of the elderly. In 2009–10, those 65 and over received on average $316pw 
in health benefits, while the average for all households was $181pw. Compared 
with 1984, the share for the elderly nearly tripled, while for all households the 
increase was 100 per cent (for couple families it was 80 per cent).
It is worth noting that, as Table 3 shows, changes in household size play little 
part in these trends. Surprisingly, average household size has not changed in 
this period for couples with children. Thus, there is no distortion in the trends 
in social support caused by declining household numbers (fewer children 
getting less in total education support for example). On the other hand elderly 
households have contracted a little, so analysed on a per capita basis their gains 
relative to couple families are to that extent greater than they appear in Table 
4. However, the average size of all households has also contracted by a similar 
amount, so on that comparison there has been no per capita gain to elderly 
households.
Table 3: Household size, 1984 and 2009–10
1984 2009–10
Couples with children 4.1 4.1
65 and over 1.7 1.5
All households 2.8 2.6
Source: ABS Cat. No. 6537.0.
Taking taxation and expenditure together, we can see from Table 2 that the 
elderly have gained very strongly relative to all households, and even more 
strongly relative to couple families. For our purposes, the comparison with all 
households is more important than that with couple families. ‘All households’ 
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can be taken as a stable benchmark. Looking at the gains in net benefits to 
elderly households relative to the trends for all households, what stands out is 
the massive leap in support for the elderly between 2003–04 and 2009–10. This 
is much greater than the gains in the previous 20 years (up by $166pw in six 
years, as against $95pw in 20 years).
The factors operating here are varied, as Table 4 shows. While taxes stayed 
steady, social expenditures were growing substantially. Overall benefits per 
elderly household grew by 29 per cent. The largest growth was in health 
expenditure, up by 37 per cent.
Table 4: Taxes and benefits to households 65 and over, 2003–04 to 
2009–10 (2010 dollars per household per week)
2003–04 2009–10 Change ($) Change %
Direct social assistance 296 349 +53 +18
Age pension 227 253
Veterans’ pension 48 35
Disability support 7 15
Other pensions and allowances 8 36
Health benefits 231 317 +86 +37
Acute care institutions 114 156
Community health services 56 68
Pharmaceuticals 51 66
Private Health Insurance Rebate* 11
Other health benefits 10 14
Other welfare benefits 57 80 +23 +40
All benefits 593 764 +171 +29
Taxes on income 49 40 -9 -18
Indirect taxes 108 120 +12 +11
All taxes 157 160 +3 +2
Net benefits 436 602 +166 +38
* Previously included in ‘Other health benefits’.
Source: ABS Cat. No. 6537.0.
Age pension increases, though substantial, were not a major driver of these 
expenditure increases. In 2009 the Rudd government introduced an 18 per cent 
increase in the standard (single person) age pension and a six per cent increase 
in couples pensions.4 A further increase followed in early 2010. Large though 
4 Guide to Social Security Law, FAHCSIA website, 5.2.2.10 Rates of Pension — July 1909 to Present Date.
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this increase was, constant dollar age pensions per elderly household rose by 
only 11.4 per cent between 2003–04 and 2009–10. The explanation is that age 
pension coverage was diminishing, as is shown in Table 5.
Table 5: Dependency on income support, 1984 to 2009–10 (Per cent 
principally dependent on government pensions and allowances)
1984 1988–89 1993–94 1998–99 2003–04 2009–10
Persons 65 and over 72 69 72 67 69 61
All households 26.2 24.4 29.5 27.2 27.4 22.6
Source: ABS Cat. No. 6537.0.
Figure 2 shows the overall history of taxes and benefits for elderly households. 
What stands out is the recent surge in net benefits, which took place mostly 
under Coalition government. Critics might argue that in this period the long 
Australian tradition of relative restraint on expenditure on the elderly, under 
both Labor and Coalition, was here abandoned.
Figure 2: Trends in taxes and benefits for households aged 65 and over, 
1984 to 2009–10
Source: ABS Cat. No. 6537.0.
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Incomes, assets and living standards
We might suppose that increasing support for the elderly is an expression of 
increased recognition of need. To test this claim we need to be able to rank 
‘neediness’. This can be partly done in terms of ‘equivalent final incomes’, 
which are presented in the 2003–04 and 2009–10 ABS fiscal incidence studies. 
Equivalent final incomes are final incomes adjusted by an equivalence scale to 
take account of variations in household size. The resulting figure is an economic 
index and not a dollar comparison. Table 6 shows the equivalent final incomes 
of the elderly and all households. Note that this table exaggerates the increase 
in EFI between the two surveys, because here the EFI for 2003–04 has not been 
adjusted by the CPI.5 The point of the comparison is not the relative change 
between 2003–04 and 2009–10 within each group, but the gains and losses of 
the different groups relative to each other in this period.
Table 6: Equivalent final incomes, 2003–04 and 2009–10
2003–04 2009–10 Change 2003–04 to 2009–10
Persons 65–74 489 939 +92%
Persons 75 and over 549 1006 +83%
Couples aged 65 and over 515 981 +90%
Singles aged 65 and over 475 900 +89%
All households 612 1012 +65%
Source: ABS Cat. No. 6537.0. ‘Equivalent final income’ is defined in the ABS’s ‘Glossary’ as household 
income adjusted by an equivalence scale. ‘For a lone person household it is equal to household income. For 
a household comprising more than one person, it is an indicator of the household income that would need 
to be received by a lone person household to enjoy the same level of economic wellbeing as the household 
in question’.
Table 6 shows, rather surprisingly, that older elderly (75 and over) are on average 
better off than younger elderly (65 to 74). Couples are notably better off than 
singles. But the most interesting comparison is that with all households. Rapid 
gains to the elderly in this period have brought them close to the EFI for all 
households. The gap in 2003–04 stood at about 21 per cent (based on an estimate 
that the EFI for all elderly households was about 505). In 2009–10 it had fallen 
to only about five or six per cent (estimating that the elderly EFI was about 960).
Of course equivalent final income is a measure of income adequacy, and takes 
no account of assets. Fortunately, the 2009–10 fiscal incidence study gives us a 
glimpse of the distribution of assets across the age groups. As Table 7 shows, 
wealthier households are older households. Net worth peaks at around age 
5 Table 1 of the 2009-10 survey shows that EFIs rose by 27 per cent from 2003-04 to 2009-10, not 65 per 
cent as suggested here.
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60. A sharper picture is obtained if we take household size into account using 
equivalence scales. Here we have used the square root of household size (a 
method that approximates quite closely to the ‘OECD modified’ scale used by 
the ABS to calculate equivalent final incomes). The resulting ‘equivalent net 
worth’ indicates that even households aged 75 and over are one-third better off 
than the mean for all households, while households in the 65–74 age group are 
60 per cent better off than the mean.
Table 7: Household net worth by age group, 2009–10




76 460 256 702 553 547 989 253 1 068 851 950 959 764 561 729 442
Household 
size
2.4 2.5 3.4 3.0 2.2 1.8 1.6 2.6
Equivalent 
net worth
49 329 162 469 300 840 571 823 722 197 709 671 604 396 453 070
Source: ABS Cat. No. 6537.0.
If we could combine equivalent income measures with the net-worth data, we 
could arrive at a plausible assessment of relative living standards across the age 
spectrum. However, the fiscal incidence surveys do not report any integrated 
measure of this sort. We can only guess at what the result might be. Given 
that equivalent final incomes for the elderly are now close to the average for all 
households, and that the net-worth distribution is skewed in favour of older 
households, we can reasonably infer that an integrated measure would show 
that households headed by persons 65 and over are better off than the average 
for all households under that age.
If all this is right, the Australian system of social transfers to the elderly is 
much more than a safety net. Viewed in ‘lifecycle’ terms, it shifts resources from 
the income-rich but asset-poor stages of life to the asset-rich but income-poor 
stage. Viewed in terms of the ‘vertical’ dimension, it is a system of upwards 
redistribution from the less well off to the better off.
Conclusion
In this paper we have been using a very broad definition of the welfare state, 
seeing it as including standard cash transfers (pensions and benefits); in-kind 
expenditures on health, education and housing; and taxation (direct and 
indirect). Fiscal incidence analysis enables us to track social spending and 
taxing at the household level. We have examined how the Australian welfare 
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state, thus defined, has served various age groups through the 26 years from 
1984 to 2010. Being focused on households, the analysis is thereby independent 
of demographic trends.
Our main findings in this paper are threefold. The first is that in this period the 
Australian welfare state has shifted focus in favour of the elderly. Substantial 
gains have been made by the elderly at the expense of those in the 25 to 54 age 
groups.
Secondly, the pace of this trend has changed. From 1984 to 2003–04 there was a 
slow but steady drift towards increased support for the elderly. After 2003–04 
it accelerated. Gains to the elderly in this last period are driven by increased 
benefits in health care, pensions and other welfare support.
Thirdly, in part as a result of this sharp upturn, elderly households are today 
almost as well off as the average for all households when measured in terms of 
equivalent final incomes. They are clearly better off than average households 
when measured using equivalent net worth. The notion of a welfare system that 
redistributes upwards across age groups thus may be close to reality.
In response to our first two contentions, one might reply that simply measuring 
trends using the CPI to translate past figures into 2010 dollars is misleading. 
Two arguments might be given. One is that purchasing power parity is a better 
indicator of changes in dollar values over time. This may be so; it is a line worth 
pursuing. But it won’t explain why one group or category gains relative to other 
groups or categories. All that the argument can show is that the relative gains 
and losses are not best measured using the CPI. A second argument is that rising 
general wealth should especially benefit the elderly, because although they 
paid relatively little taxation in earlier years, that ‘little’ was a relatively large 
sacrifice at that time when general standards were lower. Thomson argues that 
we should use some indicator of average male wages as an index, rather than the 
CPI, to take account of this (Thomson 1996: 167ff). Again, this is a line worth 
pursuing. It may modify our conclusions.
In this study we have been tracking categories of household, not actual social 
groupings. However, when trends in social support move in tandem with the 
ageing of certain cohorts, the effect is likely to be a favouritism that raises 
questions of intergenerational equity. To explore this further would require a 
cohort study, and we have not attempted that here.
Our three findings require interpretation. What might explain them? It is not 
easy to discern any party-political or ideological influence on these trends. The 
general drift towards favouring the elderly ran a slow and smooth course up to 
2004, under 12 years of Labor and eight years of the Coalition. Nearly four of 
the six years after 2004 when this tendency suddenly accelerated were under 
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the Howard government but two were under the Rudd Labor government. The 
political explanation for this upturn, if there is one, is unclear. The main age-
related policy innovation of these 26 years was the introduction of compulsory 
superannuation, accepted by all the main parties as a strategy for controlling 
age-related fiscal demands. But just when that policy seemed to be having some 
effect, elderly expenditure accelerated. Most likely gains to the elderly are not 
the consequence of deliberate policy. They probably arise from incremental 
adjustments, no one of which is significant but which cumulatively produce 
substantial net effects.
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